posit estimates of the adverse selection component of the effective spread are increasing in the proximity of the trade size to the currently quoted depth, and not simply unconditional trade size. 6 This is the main message of this paper and the focus of our empirical analyses. Like prior research we investigate the relation between the estimated adverse selection component of the spread and trade size, but we posit that the market maker's definition of a 'large trade' is conditioned on the currently quoted depth.
We document that adverse selection spread component estimates [estimated by methods from either Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) or Huang and Stoll (1997) ] increase steadily with trade size relative to (i.e. divided by) depth, peak at trade sizes equal to quoted depth, and are flat at trade sizes above quoted depth.
When we pit unconditional trade size against trade size relative to depth in a 'horse race' to explain adverse selection component estimates, the clear winner is trade size relative to depth. Holding trade size relative to depth constant, we find very little relation between adverse selection spread component estimates and trade size.
However, we find a strong positive relation between adverse selection spread component estimates and trade size relative to depth while holding trade size constant. These results are robust to several sensitivity analyses, including controls for autocorrelation, outliers, and the level of quoted depth, the use of non-parametric tests, and estimations where the quoted spread is not bound by the minimum tick size.
We then examine intraday patterns in adverse selection spread component estimates in the context of trade size relative to depth. Prior research [Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) and Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) ] documents declining adverse selection spread component estimates across the trading day, consistent with the hypothesis that informed trading is highest early in the day and declines thereafter, as modeled in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) . We first document that trade size relative to depth is highest in the first half-hour of trading, declines steadily until about mid-day, then remains fairly constant until closing, consistent with the joint hypothesis that informed trading is highest early in the day, and high trade size relative to depth is indicative of informed trading.
order receiving price improvement is declining in that order's size relative to both the depth at the time of the trade and the firm's average quoted depth for the year.
We then examine the intraday pattern in adverse selection estimates conditional on trade size relative to depth, and find the pattern weakens as trade size relative to depth increases. When trade sizes equal (or exceed) the quoted depth, there is no intraday pattern in adverse selection spread components. These results suggest market makers rely less on time of day to infer informed trading as trade size relative to depth increases, and
time of day appears irrelevant in assessing the probability of informed trading when trade size is very near or exceeds the quoted depth.
We conclude from our analyses that transaction size and informed trading are, indeed, positively related, but not in the way generally thought. In terms of making inferences about informed trading, "big" trades are better defined by their proximity to quoted depth than by the raw number of shares traded. Further, while both the proximity of the trade to quoted depth and the time of day the trade occurs are associated with the probability the trade is informationally motivated, the importance of time of day declines as trade size approaches quoted depth. When trade size equals the quoted depth, the probability the trade is informationally motivated is so high that time of day becomes irrelevant.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Section I describes the sample selection procedures and the data.
Section II reports empirical results on the relation between the adverse selection spread component and both trade size and trade size relative to depth. Section III investigates intraday variation in adverse selection spread component estimates conditional on trade size relative to depth. Section IV concludes.
I. Sample and data
The sample is drawn from 349 firms listed in the 1988-1989 Financial Analysts' Federation reports on corporate disclosure quality. The firms vary considerably in market capitalization, trade size, trading volume, spreads, and depths, and are not concentrated in any particular industry.
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A total of 314 of these firms have sufficient quote and trade data available from the 1988 ISSM database. The firms were selected first for use in another project. We later compare our sample to those used in prior studies and to the population of NYSE firms.
8 Some studies [e.g. Kavajecz (1999) , Kavajecz and Odders-White (1999) ] use the TORQ database to examine the interaction between the specialist and orders on the limit order book. Our focus is on simply documenting the importance of depth, regardless of whether provided by the specialist or the limit orders, in defining trade size.
Following Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) , we estimate adverse selection spread components from ordinary least squares estimation of the following firm-specific regression,
where ∆ is the first difference operator, M i,t is the log quoted spread midpoint at time t for firm i, M i,t-1 is the log quoted spread midpoint at time t-1 for firm i, and P i,t-1 is the log transaction price prior to the quoted spread at time t for firm i. We truncate observations entering these regressions at the 99 th and 1 st percentiles of their distributions to minimize the influence of extreme values. The term in parentheses is the effective spread and the parameter estimate, ASC i , is the estimated adverse selection component of the spread.
9, 10 9 Later, we discuss sensitivity analyses employing the Huang and Stoll (1997) method.
10 Since Lee and Ready (1991) show that prevailing quotes may sometimes be recorded ahead of trades, we define the prevailing quote for each transaction as the quote in effect five seconds before the transaction. Like other studies, we exclude the opening transaction of each day since it is conducted in a call market. Like Lin, Sanger and Booth (1995) , when ISSM reports a series of trades with identical price, time, and volume, we keep only the first trade in the series.
In panel B of Table I , we provide descriptive information at the transaction level. The effective spread is twice the absolute value of the difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade. Trade size is the number of shares traded in the transaction, depth is the number of shares quoted at the time the trade occurred, on the side (bid or ask) on which the trade occurred, and trade size relative to depth is trade size divided by depth. 11 From panel B of Table I , effective spreads average 15.7 cents per share, and the transaction level mean trade size is just over 2,100 shares. The median trade size is 500 shares, and is less than 1,700 shares for over 75 percent of our observations. Quoted depth at the time of the trade, on the side of the market on which the trade occurs, averages just over 74 round lots (7,400 shares), with a median of 45. The mean trade size relative to depth is 0.895; however, the median is only 0.20, and 75 percent of the transactions occur in sizes less than 70 percent of the quoted depth. 12 At both the firm and transaction level, our sample appears very similar to those of other microstructure studies [e.g. Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) , Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) , and Krinsky and Lee (1996) ] sampling different NYSE firms over similar time periods.
II. Results

A. Univariate analyses
We first replicate previous research on adverse selection spread component estimates and trade size. To facilitate comparison to prior research [Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) ], we partition each firm's trades into six 11 Trades are classified as buys or sells by applying the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm as follows. Trades at or nearer the quoted ask are classified as buys. Trades at or nearer the quoted bid are classified as sells. Trades at the quote midpoint are classified using the tick test, as described in Lee and Ready (1991) . If the change in price is zero the tick test is applied to the first non-zero-price-change transaction in the preceding five transactions. Remaining unclassified transactions are excluded. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) find the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm accurately classifies 92 percent of the trades classifiable in the TORQ database, with 96 percent accuracy on trades executed at the bid or ask price, 70 percent accuracy on trades executed inside the spread, but not at the quote midpoint, and 65 percent accuracy on trades executed at the quote midpoint. 71 percent of our trades were executed at the bid or ask price, 10 percent were executed inside the spread but not at the quote midpoint, and 19 percent were executed at the quote midpoint. Odders-White (2000) and Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000) document that the Lee and Ready algorithm correctly classifies over 83 percent of the transactions in their respective samples, and that trades executed inside the spread are more likely to be misclassified. To the extent this algorithm fails to accurately classify trades, our analyses are biased away from finding significant relations between adverse selection estimates and trade size relative to depth.
12 Some orders may be 'batched' together and executed as a single trade. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) Table III suggests no evidence of a positive relation between adverse selection estimates and trade size, once trade size to depth is held constant.
Next we ask whether the reverse is true: are adverse selection estimates related to trade size to depth after holding trade size constant? Thus, we reverse the procedure employed in Table III , and partition each firm's trades into five quintiles based on trade size. Within each trade size quintile for each firm, we further partition the trades into six groups based on the same six percentile categories (as in Tables II and III) of trade size divided by depth, and estimate equation (1) by firm, separately for each of these 30 groups. Table IV presents the average adverse selection estimate within each trade size to depth group and trade size quintile. Table IV In each of these two trade size quintiles, mean adverse selection estimates increase uniformly with trade size relative to depth, and all of the increases in the mean adverse selection estimates across successive trade size to depth groups are significant at the 1 percent level or better.
Average adverse selection estimates increase with trade size divided by depth in the fourth and fifth trade size quintiles, though fewer of the increases in mean adverse selection estimates are statistically significant. In the fourth trade size quintile, adverse selection averages 14.5 percent of the total effective spread in the lowest trade size to depth group, and over 61 percent of the total effective spread for trades in the highest 25 percent of trade size to depth (i.e., the 75-89, 90-94, and 95-100 percentile groups). Three of the five increases in mean adverse selection estimates are significant at the 1 percent level in the fourth trade size quintile. 16 In the fifth trade size quintile, adverse selection estimates average 25.5 percent of the total effective spread in the smallest trade size to depth percentile, 58.2 in the second largest trade size to depth group, and over 63 percent in the remaining trade size to depth groups. Two of the five increases in mean adverse selection estimates are significant at the 1 percent level in this quintile. The evidence in the fourth and five trade size quintiles suggest that estimated adverse selection components are increasing in trade size to depth, but level off at high levels of trade size relative to depth. Perhaps the latter result is due to a combination of (a) increased batching of multiple trades in these quintiles (see footnote 11), or (b) the presence of block or other large trades.
Existing research [Keim and Madhavan (1996) , Barclay and Warner (1993) , Chakravarty (2000) ] suggests the price impact of trades is non-linear in trade size, either because informed traders choose not to submit very large orders and/or because large blocks precipitate the block trader to locate more counterparties to the trade and lower its liquidity cost. Also, some large trades are 'shopped' in the 'upstairs' market with possible assurances they are not informationally motivated. We leave exploration of these issues for future research.
Our evidence thus far suggests adverse selection spread component estimates are related to the size of a trade, but not in the way suggested by previous research. We find the size of a trade is much better defined by its proximity to quoted depth than by the raw number of shares traded. We next estimate a multiple regression designed to further examine which measure (trade size relative to depth or raw trade size) better explains adverse selection estimates.
For this test we assume that, within the relevant range of the data (trades in sizes up to 100 percent of the quoted depth at the time of the trade, the risk of informed trading for firm i (ASC i ) is a linear function of firm 
where
We add an intercept and estimate equation (3) by firm using ordinary least squares. 18 The coefficients on the terms in equation (3) Earlier results, presented in Tables II and IV , suggest the relation between adverse selection spread component estimates and trade size relative to depth may be non-linear. Specifically, as trade size relative to depth rises above one, the rate of increase in adverse selection estimates declines (see panel B of Table II and cells where the mean trade size divided by depth is greater than one in the third, fourth, and fifth trade size quintiles of Table IV) . If so, the linearity assumption we make in estimating equation (3) quantile contains trades where trade size divided by depth equals exactly 1.0. We estimate equation (1) for each firm-quantile, with the average for each quantile shown in Figure 1 . Figure 1 shows a reasonably linear relation between adverse selection spread estimates and trade size to depth, up to the trade size to depth quantile including 1.0. Right at the trade size to depth quantile including 1.0, the slope of this relation spikes sharply upward. Beyond this quantile, there appears to be no or a slightly inverse relation between adverse selection spread estimates and trade size relative to depth. This pattern is consistent with our intuition, which predicts the market maker's adverse selection problem is worst at trade sizes approximately equal to the quoted depth. Beyond this point, there are likely to be considerably more trades for which the market maker has received assurances or otherwise determined that the trade is uninformed, and more batching of multiple orders. Because of this non-linearity, and because we expect many trades in sizes greater than quoted depth are less likely to be informed trades, we limit estimation of equation (3) to trades that are less than 100 percent of the quoted depth at the time of the trade.
Table V presents descriptive information on the distribution of coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the 314 firm-specific estimations of equation (3). Table V In sum, the evidence in Table V suggests trade size divided by depth explains much more of estimated adverse selection spread component estimates than does trade size. In fact, we must conclude from Table V that after controlling for trade size relative to depth, raw trade size has almost no explanatory power for most firms' adverse selection spread component estimates. Our evidence suggests that, with respect to information conveyed, the size of a trade is much better defined by how big it is relative to currently quoted depth than by its raw size in number of shares.
C. Sensitivity analyses
The sensitivity analyses outlined in this section focus on the potential effects of (a) autocorrelation, (b) the (known) inverse relation between spreads and depths, (c) alternative spread decomposition models, and (d) the potential impact of price discreteness on variation in quoted depth. Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) document autocorrelation in intraday data. Thus, we also estimated equation (3) with an autoregressive error structure using a maximum of sixty lags. 19 The coefficient estimates and t-statistics from this procedure (untabulated) are very similar to those reported in Table 5 and we conclude our results are robust to autocorrelation controls. Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) also find an inverse relation between spreads and depths. Since our variable of interest is trade size scaled by depth, we endeavor to determine whether our results are driven simply by the inclusion of the inverse of depth. We add the inverse of depth (1/depth) as an additional explanatory variable to equation (3) and estimate the following using ordinary least squares, 19 We used the BACKSTEP option in PROC AUTOREG in SAS. Adding the inverse depth interaction term enhances the explanatory power of the raw trade size interaction beyond that reported in Table V . However, the results on this variable remain far weaker than those on the trade size relative to depth interaction. The mean and median parameter estimates of α 2,i are positive (0.00657 and 0.00678 respectively), but the t-statistics (mean = 2.17 and median = 1.93) are relatively weak.
Additionally, in only 171 (55 percent) of the firm-specific regressions is the parameter estimate for the trade size variable positive and significant at the 5 percent level or better. Further, several of the estimates on this variable are actually negative and significant. Thus, we conclude that the dominance of trade size to depth over trade size in explaining adverse selection spread components is not due to a simple relation between adverse selection estimates and depth.
We also examine the sensitivity of our results to an alternative spread decomposition approach. Glosten and Harris (1988) develop a spread decomposition model by relating changes in price to transaction size and an indicator for whether the trade was buyer or seller initiated. This method has been used [Glosten and Harris 20 Results from equation (4) are untabulated. Since we use 1/depth a positive coefficient is consistent with an inverse relation between spreads and depths noted in prior research.
(1988), Hasbrouck (1991) , Brennan and Subramanyam (1995) , and others], to develop estimates of the 'Kyle lambda', a measure of market liquidity based on Kyle (1985) .
In the Glosten and Harris (1988) method the adverse selection component as a percentage of the spread is modeled to increase with trade size. As shown in Huang and Stoll (1997) , the Glosten and Harris (1988) model, and variants of it used in related papers, is a restricted version of the Huang and Stoll (1997) Finally, we consider whether our results are attributable to variation in quoted depths at different levels of the discrete quoted spreads. We repeated the tests reported in Table V on those observations where the quoted spread, at the time of the transaction, is at least 2/8 ths , and again where the quoted spread at the time of the transaction is only 1/8 th . The results were very similar in both groups and nearly identical to those reported in Table V .
III. Intraday patterns in informed trading
Prior research [Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) , Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997)] documents a distinct and declining intraday pattern in adverse selection estimates.
21
If informed trading is highest early in the day and declining thereafter, and if trade size relative to depth is an indicator of informed trading, we expect to see a declining pattern in trade size relative to depth during the trading day. Figure 2 shows the median trade size relative to depth (top panel) and the proportion of trades in sizes at the depth (bottom panel) across the 13 half-hour intervals of the trading day. Consistent with the notion that trade size relative to depth is related to adverse selection risk, both the median trade size to depth and the proportion of trades at the depth exhibit intraday patterns almost identical to the intraday pattern in adverse 21 We confirmed the intraday adverse selection spread component pattern in our data. Our adverse selection spread component estimates decline from over 43 percent of the effective spread during the first half-hour of trading to about 35 percent by the middle of the afternoon, and are relatively flat thereafter.
selection spread components documented in prior research. adverse selection estimates for the full sample.
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We then compute the 78 (13 times 6) mean adverse selection estimates (ASC h,j ) for each half-hour h and trade size to depth category j. We estimate ordinary least squares regressions of the following equation for each of the six trade size to depth categories
22 Mean trade size to depth displays the same pattern as median trade size to depth, although the level is considerably higher due to the highly skewed nature of the distribution.
where TIME h,j equals either 1, 2, 3,….,13, i.e., it is the number of the half-hour interval from which ASC h,j is computed. We include the square of TIME h,j to capture the curvilinear shape of intraday adverse selection spread components. Since adverse selection estimates decline over at least the first half of the day, the first derivative of equation (5) with respect to TIME h,j should be negative, i.e., β 1 + 2 (β 2 ) (TIME h,j ) < 0, during the first half of the day. However, during at least the first half of the day, adverse selection estimates appear to decline at a decreasing rate, thus the second derivative of equation (5) with respect to TIME h, j should be positive, i.e., 2 (β 2 ) (TIME h,j ) > 0. This is equivalent to a simple test of whether β 2 > 0.
Results are presented in Table VI . Despite the small number of observations (13) (5) where trade size relative to depth is less than 0.90, the coefficient on TIME h,j (TIME 2 h,j ) is negative (positive), and significant at less than the 0.01 level, and the adjusted R 2 's range from 73.05 percent to 90.50 percent. 25 Further, the first derivative is negative and significant at the 5 percent level or better for each of at least the first seven half-hours.
This suggests adverse selection spread component estimates decline, at a decreasing rate, across the trading day for trades in sizes less than 90 percent of the quoted depth.
Estimation of equation (5) for the last two trade size percentile categories yields markedly different results, however. In these two trade size to depth categories, the estimated first derivative of equation (5) is not negative for any of the half hours. Thus, as trade size to depth approaches and exceeds 1.0, adverse selection estimates do not appear to decline from morning through midday. In other words, the intraday pattern in adverse selection estimates does not appear to be present for very large (relative to depth) trades.
Figure 3 displays these patterns graphically. Figure 3 shows the deviation in the mean adverse selection estimate in each of the 12 half-hours from half-hour 2 through half-hour 13 from the mean adverse selection estimate in the first half-hour for 3 distinct trade size relative to depth categories (0-24, 50-74, and 90-100). For trade size relative to depth less than 0.75 (bottom 2 graphs in Figure 3 ), mean adverse selection estimates are higher in the early part of the trading day, decline to midday, and remain constant thereafter. The top graph in Figure 3 , displays a distinctly different pattern for trade sizes between 90 and 100 percent of quoted depth 25 All p-values in Table VI are for two-tailed hypothesis tests of whether the coefficient differs from zero.
however. The deviations in mean adverse selection estimates for trade size close to quoted depth essentially hover around zero. That is, for trades in sizes very near quoted depth, adverse selection estimates do not vary across the day.
In summary, we conclude that trade sizes near the quoted depth are so likely informationally motivated that no additional information about the likelihood of informed trading is obtained from the time of day the trade is submitted .
IV. Conclusions
Previous research [Huang and Stoll (1997) , Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) , Glosten and Harris (1988)] suggests adverse selection spread component estimates are increasing in trade size. However, quoted depth provides the maximum amount the market maker "guarantees" to trade at prevailing prices. Thus, we investigate whether adverse selection spread component estimates are related to the proximity of trade size relative to quoted depth and run a "horse race" between trade size and trade size relative to depth in explaining adverse selection estimates.
Our empirical analyses reveal several new findings. We find estimates of the adverse selection component of the spread are uniformly increasing in the magnitude of trade size relative to depth. Further, we find adverse selection spread component estimates are at best weakly related to raw trade size if trade size relative to depth is held constant. However, adverse selection spread component estimates remain strongly related to trade size relative to depth even when raw trade size once held constant. We interpret these results as support for the notion that the size of a trade is related to the likelihood the trade is informationally motivated, but in a manner different from previously thought. Large trades appear better defined by the number of shares relative to the quoted depth at the time of the trade than simply by raw number of shares.
We also examine the intraday pattern in adverse selection estimates in the context of trade size relative to depth. We find trade size relative to depth exhibits an intraday pattern very similar to that documented for adverse selection estimates. Trade size relative to depth is highest at the beginning of the day and declines through midday, remaining fairly constant to the end of the day. We find that the intraday pattern in adverse selection estimates persists across most trade size relative to depth levels, but, interestingly, disappears as trade size relative to depth approaches and exceeds one. This evidence suggests that for large trades (relative to j,h,t where M i,j,h,t is the quoted spread midpoint at time t for firm i, trade size to depth quantile j, half hour h, and U i,j,t-1 is the transaction price prior to the quoted spread at time t for firm i, trade size to depth quantile j, half hour h. Each firm-quantile-half hour is required to have at least 30 observations. Trade size is the number of shares traded in one buy or sell. Depth is the quoted bid depth for sells or the quoted ask depth for buys for the best bid or best ask in effect at the time of the transaction. These (314 firms times 78 =) 24,492 ASC i,j,h estimates were then averaged across firms, by half hour and trade size to depth level, producing 13 means for each trade size to depth level. The figure shows, within three different trade size to depth levels, the percentage deviation of each half hour's mean adverse selection estimate from the first half hour's mean adverse selection estimate.
Table I Summary statistics for sample
The sample consists of 314 NYSE firms with data on the 1988 ISSM database. In Panel A, the data are first averaged by day and firm. Table entries are then computed from the 314 firm-specific averages. In Panel B, Table entries are computed across all transactions. Share price is the midpoint of the quoted bid and ask prices, share volume is number of shares traded, dollar volume is number of shares traded times the transaction price, firm size is share price times number of outstanding common shares, dollar spread is the ask price minus the bid price, relative spread is dollar spread divided by share price, trade size is the number of shares traded, effective spread is twice the absolute value of the difference between the trade price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade, and dollar trade size is the number of shares traded times the transaction price. The adverse selection spread component is estimated for each firm from the following regression: 
where M i,j,t is the quoted spread midpoint at time t for firm i in trade size or trade size to depth category j, and U i,j,t-1 is the transaction price prior to the quoted spread at time t for firm i in trade size or trade size to depth category j. The mean adverse selection estimate, trade size, and trade size to depth are then computed within six percentile groups. A firm must have at least 30 observations to be included in the calculation of the means within a transaction size group. ** indicates the mean adverse selection spread component in the trade size or trade size to depth category is significantly greater than the mean in the preceding trade size or trade size to depth category at the 1 percent level or better. where M i,j,t is the quoted spread midpoint at time t for firm i, trade size percentile j, and U i,j,t-1 is the transaction price prior to the quoted spread at time t for firm i, trade size percentile j. Firms must have at least 30 observations in a particular trade size to depth percentile and trade size quintile to be included in the calculations. Trade size is the number of shares traded and depth is the number of shares quoted at the time of a trade, on the side of the market on which the trade occurs. **indicates the mean in the trade size to depth group is significantly greater than the mean in the preceding trade size to depth group (within trade size quintiles) at the 1 percent level or better. M i,t is the quoted spread midpoint at time t for firm i, U i,t-1 is the transaction price prior to the quoted spread at time t for firm i, TRSZ is the number of shares traded, and DEPTH is the number of shares quoted at the time of the trade, on the side of the market on which the trade occurs.
Panel
The table reports descriptive statistics on the distributions of the coefficient estimates, t-statistics, and adjusted R 2 's from the 314 firm-specific regressions. The Num at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 cells provide the number of the times that the t-statistics from the individual regressions were significant at less than the 1, 5, or 10 percent levels respectively (one-tailed tests). ASC h,j is the mean adverse selection estimate within each half-hour h and trade size to depth percentile category j. TIME h,j is the half-hour interval (1, 2, . . . ,13) in which the trade occured and TIME h,j 2 is TIME h,j squared. The halfhour periods begin with 9:30 -10:00 a.m. (interval 1) and proceed through 3:31 -4:00 p.m (interval 13). Trade size is the number of shares traded, and depth is the number of shares quoted at the time of the trade, on the side of the market on which the trade occurs. Each regression uses 13 observations. To yield the 13 observations used in each regression, we first estimate, for each firm i, ASC i within trade size to depth percentile category j and half-hour interval h, from the following equation:
∆log [M i,j,t,h where M i,j,t is the quoted spread midpoint at time t for firm i, trade size to depth group j, and U i,j,t-1 is the transaction price prior to the quoted spread at time t for firm i, trade size to depth group j.
The table reports coefficient estimates from ordinary least squares regressions, t-statistics (in parentheses) and adjusted R 2 percentages.
3 The column labeled "Half hours 1 st derivative <0 at 5% significance" shows the specific half hours, numbered 1 through 13, for which the first derivative of the ASC h,j regression is negative and significant at the 5 percent level or better. The first derivative of the equation estimated is β 1 + 2 (β 2 ) (TIME h,j ). 4 * and ** indicate the coefficient is significantly different from zero (two-tailed tests) at the 5 or 1 percent level respectively. 
Half hours 1st
